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Abstract
This article aims at sketching the prima facie “paradoxical” legal status of “slaves” in
Roman law. Hence, it deals with principles and rules directed to regulate two paradig-
matic and highly relevant areas of economic life, i.e. sale and agency. Both shared the
fundamental presence of serviormancipia, conceived at times asmere objects, at times
as real individuals. On the one hand, according to non-Roman conceptions (that con-
sider slavery per se a liminal and, thereby, indefinable institution), the law concerning
serviles personae would represent such a contradiction by merging the Aristotelian
categories of bios and zoe. On the other hand, pre-classical and classical Roman law,
adhering to a functional and wide notion of legal persona, and embodying a status-
system, transcends any apparent inconsistency betweenproperty lawandbusiness law.
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Introduction: Is Slavery a Roman “Paradox”?
AUbiquitous and Ambiguous Institution
“Outside the region of procedure, there are few branches of the law in which
the slave does not prominently appear.”1 Bearing this over-quoted statement
1 WilliamWarwick Buckland, The Roman Law of Slavery. The Conditions of the Slave in Private
Law from Augustus to Justinian (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1908, reprint 1970),
vi. Estimates of the percentage of the slave population of Italy range from 15% to 40% in the
serviles personae in roman law 93
Journal of Global Slavery 3 (2018) 92–128
in mind allows for the framing of the supposed great “paradox” that charac-
terized the archaic, pre-classical, and classical Roman law. A tablet found in
London and dating back to late first century a.d. would seem to illustrate such
a “paradox,” as well as the inner complexity of the Roman system, by docu-
menting a sale including a warranty against defects and eviction, together with
a personal guarantee.2 The buyer, Vegetus, is a slave of Montanus, also a slave
of the Emperor, and the good sold bymancipatio is likewise a slave, a girl called
Fortunata. Slaves buy. Slaves are bought. Slaves have dependents. Slaves are
dependents.
Slaves between Status and Ownership
From several “patrimonial” aspects of the law of slavery, it is evident that servi
ormancipia (the Roman legal terms regularly denoting slaves) were conceived
of as res:3 slavery was indeed defined by late-classical jurists as “an institution
of ius gentium whereby a human being is, contrary to nature, subject to the
dominical power of another.”4 Already in the last centuries of the Republican
first century b.c.; some 10% of the total population might represent the lowest limit for the
Empire as a whole. See Keith R. Bradley, Slavery and Society at Rome (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1994), 12; Walter Scheidel, “The Roman Slave Supply,” in Keith B. Bradley
and Paul Cartledge, eds.,The CambridgeWorldHistory of Slavery 1,TheAncientMediterranean
World (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 2011), 288–310; Alessandro Launaro, Peasants
and Slaves: The Rural Population of Roman Italy (200b.c. to a.d. 100) (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2011), 16. See also William Linn Westermann, “Industrial Slavery in Roman
Italy,” Journal of Economic History 2 (1942): 149–163; William Linn Westermann, The Slave
Systems of Greek and Roman Antiquity (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1955),
68–69; Keith Hopkins, Conquerors and Slaves: Sociological Studies in Roman History (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 99–100.
2 Roger S.O. Tomlin, “The Girl in Question: a New Next from Roman London,” Britannia 34
(2003): 41–51; Giuseppe Camodeca, “Cura secunda della tabula cerata londinese con la com-
pravendita della puella Fortunata,”Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik 157 (2006): 225–
230.
3 For an approach to the historical, social, and legal process of “reification” of slaves in archaic
Rome, see Giorgio Bonabello, “La ‘fabbricazione’ dello schiavo nell’antica Roma. Un’antropo-
poiesi a rovescio,” in Francesco Remotti, ed., Forme di umanità (Milano: Mondadori, 2002),
52–71.
4 d. 1.5.4.1; see i. 1.2.2, 3.3.2; d. 1.1.4; d. 50.17.32; Aldo Schiavone, “Legge di natura o convenzione
sociale? Aristotele, Cicerone, Ulpiano sulla schiavitù-merce,” in Mauro Moggi and Giuseppe
Cordiano, eds., Schiavi e dipendenti nell’ambito dell’«oikos» e della «familia». Atti del xxii
Colloquio girea, Pontignano 19–20 novembre 1995 (Pisa: Edizioni ets, 1997), 173–182; Eleonora
Cavallini, “Legge di natura e condizione dello schiavo,” Labeo 40 (1994): 72–86; Ernst Levy,
“Natural law in Roman Thought,” Studia et Documenta Historiae Iuris 15 (1949): 1–21; Alberto
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era, Cato unsympathetically described slaves in terms of stock to be bought
and sold, as well as in terms of pledgeable assets; likewise, Varro maintained
that a slave, as instrumentum vocale, is a piece of property, a commodity, in the
same way of oxen and wagons are.5 Therefore, it is not erroneous to highlight
that servi, as such, lacked any “legal, patrimonial and proprietary capacity,” as
well as any “procedural standing,” during the Republic and the first centuries of
the Empire, until the ius naturae gradually inspired more and more “humane”
disciplines and treatments. Yet, one must be aware that this perspective is
a non-historical one, tending to read the past—in particular the hierarchic
stratifications that grounded and shapedRoman society as awhole—bymeans
of current categories.6
The Roman ius personarum—and, as a result, any other area concerning
relationships between individuals—was not focussed on the simple concept
of “capacity,” but on a multifaceted and multileveled system of “status” imply-
ing different duties and powers depending on the particular community to
which one belonged.7 Thus, maintaining indignantly that a slave was not a real
“person” in the world of law, is misleading, inexact, and totally inadequate to
understand (and not to judge) the Romans and their culture. For example, just
like a slave, who was granted no “capacity,” even a consul—that is the supreme
Burdese, “Il concettodi iusnaturalenel pensierodella giurisprudenza classica,”Rivista italiana
per la scienze giuridiche 7 (1954): 407–421; Joseph Modrzejewski, “Aut nascuntur aut fiunt:
les schémas antiques des sources de l’esclavage,” Bullettino dell’Istituto di diritto romano 79
(1976): 15, 20; RenzoLambertini, “L’etimologia di servus secondo i giuristi romani,” inVincenzo
Giuffrè, ed., Sodalitas. Scritti in onore di Antonio Guarino 5 (Napoli: Jovene, 1984), 2385–2394;
Elisabeth Herrmann-Otto, Ex ancilla natus. Untersuchungen zu den ‘hausgeborenen’ Sklaven
und Sklavinnen imWesten des römischen (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1993), 23 and n. 100;
Gabrio Lombardi, Ricerche in tema di ius gentium (Milano: Giuffrè, 1946) 157ff.; Wolfgang
Waldstein, “Jus naturale im nachklassischen römischen Recht und bei Justinian,” Zeitschrift
der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte 111 (1994): 1–65.
5 Cato, 2.7; Cato, 159.2; Varro, 1.17.1.
6 See, for the simplistic view adopting these modern and current categories to describe, from
a legal perspective, “Roman individuality,” Matteo Marrone, Istituzioni di diritto romano (Pa-
lermo: Palumbo, 1994), 193; for the opposite view, denying the presence of these categories
in Roman legal thought, see Bernardo Albanese, Le persone in diritto romano (Palermo:
Tipografia S. Montaina, 1979), 11; Pierangelo Catalano, Diritto e persone. Studi su origine e
attualità del sistema romano 1 (Torino: Giappichelli, 1990), 167ff., 172; Sebastiano Tafaro,
“Diritto e persona: centralità dell’uomo,”Diritto @ Storia 5 (2006): 23, n. 28.
7 Luigi Garofalo, “Principi e ordinamento romano: una riflessione sulle orme di Fritz Schulz,”
in Fernando Reinoso-Barbero, ed., Principios Generales del Derecho. Antecedentes historicos y
horizonte actual (Madrid: Editorial Thomson-Aranzadi, 2014), 99–108.
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magistrate of the RomanRepublic—could not own anything and could not sue
anyone, since he was not given any “right” up to his pater’s death or up to his
emancipation.
Moreover, if nobody can deny that slaves, as res, could be ill-treated or even
inhumanely overworked8 (even though the censores, by means of their nota,
punished the domini for private cruelty towards their own slaves),9 one has to
point out the following. First, starting from the mid-republican period, slaves
appeared to become an extremely appreciated economic resource. They were
legally labelled as res mancipi, that is res pretiosiores (very valuable goods),
as Gaius still maintains in the second century a.d.10 Should a dominus have
treated his slaves cruelly and uselessly, he would have inflicted a serious eco-
nomic harm to his current assets, to any possible income, and therefore to
his present and future wealth. Second, many slaves were involved in rather
skilled jobs.11 In Rome, clerks, accountants, commercial agents, teachers, doc-
tors, rhetoricians, and even superintendents, were predominantly slaves.Many
of them, even though legally constituting “property” and—according to mod-
ern legal schemes—“object of rights,”12 lived more comfortably than most free
Roman citizens, especially if they were high-ranking officials in the adminis-
8 Keith R. Bradley, Slavery andMasters in the Roman Empire: A Study in Social Control (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 113 ff.
9 Dion. Hal. 20.3.
10 Gai 2.13–14a; d. 33.7.12.44.
11 One could oppose the brutal account on the use of slaves in mines, as presented by
Alfred Michael Hirt, Imperial Mines and Quarries in the Roman World: Organizational
Aspects 27b.c.–ad 235 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 4.2.1. Yet, one has to keep
it in mind that here we are dealing with criminals that, condemned ad metalla, became
“slaves of the punishment,” servi poenae (see d. 49.14.12; d. 29.2.25.3; d. 34.8.3 pr.), and
not with servi publici or servi fisci. Accordingly, they lost their freedom, their citizenship,
their “legal capacity;” their whole property was confiscated, with some partial exceptions
(d. 48.20.7 pr.); they could not buy their freedom, be sold, or be set free, thus becoming
“walking dead” (see d. 40.5.24.5; d. 48.19.28 pr.). See Aglaia McClintock, Servi della pena.
Condannati a morte nella Roma imperial (Napoli: Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, 2010),
passim.
12 Against the view overlapping the legal term res and the concept of “object of rights,”
Yan Thomas, “Res, chose et patrimoine (Note sur le rapport sujet-objet en droit romain),”
Archives de Philosophie du droit 25 (1980): 414; Pietro Paolo Onida, Studi sulla condizione
degli animali non umani nel sistema giuridico romano (Torino: Giappichelli, 2002), 10 ff.;
Pierangelo Catalano, “Diritto, soggetti, oggetti: un contributo alla pulizia concettuale sulla
base di d. 1,1,12,” in Iuris vincula. Studi in onorediMarioTalamanca 2 (Napoli: Jovene, 2000),
102.
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trative service of the prince.13 For instance, Musicus Scurranus was a slave of
Tiberius and dispensator of the Gallic Treasury in the province of Lyon. After
his death, he was sumptuously commemorated in Rome by as many as sixteen
servi vicarii or peculiares (i.e. “under-slaves” or “slaves of slaves”):14 a commer-
cial agent, a treasurer, three secretaries, a physician, two slaves responsible for
the silverware, two general attendants, two bedroom attendants, a valet, two
cooks, and a “woman.”15
Slaves: Actors on the Stage of Law
From the “natural” and “theoretical” point of view, slaves were unambigu-
ously homines, i.e. human beings.16 They were—in the same way as the liberi
homines—personae, that is—etymologically—“individuals donning a mask,”
“actors” playing different “roles” on the “stage of law” in relation to their own
status.17 The Roman ius civile, in other words, could not rule out slaves’ human
13 Paul R.C. Weaver, Familia Caesaris: a Social Study of the Emperor’s Freedmen and Slaves
(Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 1972), passim. Some authors argue that self-sales
were possible at Rome: see Galenus fr. 50 k; Martial 9.92; Raymond Theodore Troplong,
Préface a Le Droit Civil expliqué suivant l’ordre du Code, Commentaires des titres xvi et
xvii, livre iii du Code civile (Bruxelles: Meline, Cans et compagnie, 1848); Jacques Ramin
and Paul Veyne, “Droit romain et société: les hommes libres qui passent pour esclaves et
l’esclavage volontaire,”Historia 30 (1981): 472–497; Alfred Söllner, “Irrtümlich als Sklaven
gehaltene freie Menschen und Sklaven in unsicheren Eigentumsverhältnissen—Homines
liberi et servi alieni bona fide servientes,” (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 2000); Morris Silver,
“Contractual slavery in the Roman economy,” Ancient History Bulletin 25 (2011): 73–132;
see Leo Peppe, “Fra corpo e patrimonio. Obligatus, addictus, ductus, persona in causa
mancipi,” in Alessandro Corbino, Michel Humbert and Giovanni Negri, eds., Homo, caput,
persona—La costruzione giuridica dell’identità nell’esperienza romana (Pavia: iuss Press,
2010), 457ff.
14 Francesca Reduzzi-Merola, ‘Servo parere’. Studi sulla condizione giuridica degli schiavi
vicari e dei sottoposti a schiavi nell’esperienza greca e romana (Napoli: Jovene, 1990), pas-
sim.
15 cil vi 5197= ils 1514. See for funerary commemorations by free people received by servi
institores, ils 7546, 7607, 7608.
16 d. 50.16.152: Renato Quadrato, “Hominis appellatio e gerarchia dei sessi in d. 50.16.152
(Gai. 10 ad l. Iul. et Pap.),” Bullettino dell’Istituto di diritto romano 33–34 (1991–1992): 309–
348.
17 Gai 1.8–9, 1.120ff., 3.189. See, for the view supporting the neutral and abstract nature of the
legal term persona, Vincenzo Scarano Ussani, “La ‘scoperta’ della persona,” Ostraka 18.1
(2000): 237–248; Gianluca Mainino, “Dalla persona alla persona giuridica: la persona in
Gaio e il caso delle ‘istituzioni’ alimentari nell’esperienza romana,” Studia et Documenta
Historiae Iuris 70 (2004): 481–498; UlricoAgnati, “Persona iuris vocabulum. Per un’interpre-
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characteristics,18 and accordingly, it could not fail to recognize—alongside
their intellect, their skill, and their bodily shape—their “natural” capacity to
will, to agree, to be party to a contract, and to perform.
The awareness that slaves were—and had to be recognized as - homines and
personae from a biological and legal perspective, seriously influenced Roman
society and economy.19 If, in the early Republic, a rather small number of
slaves was living in Rome, as of themid-third century b.c. the slave population
quickly expanded and, by the endof theRepublic, slaves represented one of the
most predominant factors in the economic life of the city. Some tablets foundat
Murecine from the archive of the Sulpicii (a finance firm operating in Puteoli)
clarify the importance of (skilful and smart) slaves in commerce, attesting to
some interesting aspects of the process of the conclusion and recovery of a
loan.
C. Novius Eunus is a dealer in grains and pulses, and he needs 10,000 sester-
ces.Hesicus is a slave of EuenusPrimianus, a freedmanof the emperorTiberius.
C. Novius Eunus borrows themoney fromHesicus (acting on behalf of hismas-
terwho is absent), and secures the return of themoney by stipulatio. A fewdays
later a further loan of 3,000 sesterces is concluded, but alongside the stipula-
tio (as personal security), wheat imported from Alexandria is pledged as real
security. A third tablet, indeed, records Hesicus as taking over the lease of the
tazione giuridica di persona nelle opere di Gaio,” Rivista di Diritto Romano 9 (2009): 2 ff.;
see, moreover, Jakob Fortunat Stagl, “Die Person: phrygische Mütze oder Nessushemd?—
Eine Auseinandersetzung mit Roberto Esposito’s Terza Persona,” Bonner Rechtsjournal 1
(2012): 11–20; Jakob Fortunat Stagl, Da ‘qualcosa’ a ‘qualcuno’, da ‘qualcuno’ a ‘qualcosa’.
Percorsi esatti ed errati del concetto di persona, in Pierangelo Buongiorno and Sebastion
Lohsse, eds., Fontes Iuris. Atti del vi Jahrestreffen Junger Romanistinnen und Romanisten
(Lecce, 30–31 marzo 2012) (Napoli: Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, 2013), 87–122 (pointing
out that the general concept of persona represented a vehicle of discrimination, injustice
and abuses).
18 See Olis Robleda, Il diritto degli schiavi nell’antica Roma (Roma: Università gregoriana
editrice, 1976), 72ff.; Giuliano Crifò, Libertà e uguaglianza in Roma antica (Roma: Bulzoni,
1984), 36 nt. 4; Renato Quadrato, “La persona in Gaio. Il problema dello schiavo,” Iura 37
(1986): 1 ff., 10 ff., 28; Catalano, Diritto e persone, 163 ff., 168; Sebastiano Tafaro, “Centralità
dell’uomo (persona),” in Studi per Giovanni Nicosia 8 (Milano: Giuffrè, 2007), 120ff.
19 Moses I. Finley, Ancient Slavery and Modern Ideology (New York: The Viking Press, 1980),
126ff.; Moses I. Finley, Slavery in Classical Antiquity (Cambridge:William Heffer and Sons,
Ltd., 1968), 2; KyleHarper, Slavery in the Late RomanWorld, a.d.275–425 (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2011), 39–40; Max Weber, “Die sozialen Gründe des Unterganges
der antikenKultur,” inDirkKaesler, ed.,Schriften 1894–1922 (Stuttgart: KrönerVerlag, 2002),
57; Hopkins, Conquerors and Slaves, 4 ff.
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warehouse spacewhere the stock pledgedwas stored, and on this occasion two
slaves are parties to a contract. Hesicus is the conductor, while Diognetus likely
acts as servus negotiator cum peculio: he belongs to Novius Cypaerus (a hor-
rearius having a contract from the town council for letting the horrea Bassiana
publica), and his activity is ratified by means of a dominical iussum. After one
year and two months, Hesicus stipulates that the remaining debt, including
the capital and interest, is due to be paid either to himself or to an alterna-
tive promisee (adstipulator) named Sulpicius. Finally, a last tablet attests the
total amount that was still due, a time limit for payment, and a penalty for
delay.20
Sympathy for Slavery?
Slavery is nowadays morally and ideologically unacceptable. This is incontro-
vertible and the following conclusions, based on the previous remarks, neither
hide nor openly entail a politically incorrect position sympathizing with what
is an abomination: i.e., “forcibly taking human beings as captives.”21 Yet, the so-
called “Roman slavery”, albeit seemingly rooted in the above-mentioned “para-
dox,” sounds less singularly discriminatory and less inhumane (as well as less
“paradoxical”), if one dispassionately considers the institution at issue not only
in its articulated entirety, but also as part of a wider system of status.
On the one hand, slaves did not belong to amonolithic and undifferentiated
social class deemed as always unsatisfied, exploited, and thereby regularly
occupied in acts of resistance. With the important exceptions of the areas of
politics, law, and war, private slaves were employed in any type of work.
On the other hand, the link “slavery / lack of legal capacity” is misleading,
as its two poles are not perfectly bijective. Indeed, a filius familias, albeit civis
20 TPSulp 7, 15, 16, 17, 18. Lucio Bove, Documenti di operazioni finanziarie dell’archivio dei
Sulpicii. Tabulae Pompeianae di Murecine (Napoli: Liguori, 1984), 19 ff.; Feliciano Serrao,
“Minima di Diogneto ed Hesicho: gli affari di due schiavi a Pozzuoli negli anni 30 d.C.,” in
Vincenzo Giuffrè, ed., Scritti in onore di Antonio Guarino 7 (Napoli: Jovene, 1984), 3605–
3618; for a partially different view, see Giovanna Coppola Bisazza, Dallo iussum domini
alla contemplatio domini. Contributo allo studio della storia della rappresentanza (Milano:
Giuffrè, 2008), 133 ff. Contra, see Donatella Monteverdi, “Tab. Pom. 7 e la funzione dello
iussum domini,” Labeo 42 (1996): 356; Francesca Del Sorbo, “L’autonomia negoziale degli
schiavi nella prassi giuridica campana, il dossier di C. Novius Eunus,” in Cosimo Cascione
and CarlaMasi Doria, eds., Fides Humanitas Ius. Studii in onore di Luigi Labruna 3 (Napoli:
Editoriale Scientifica, 2007), 1408–1435.
21 KeithR. Bradley, “TheProblemof Slavery inClassicalCulture,”ClassicalPhilology92 (1997):
274.
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and liber,22 was an alieni iuris individual in the same way as a servus.23 Even if
the former was intended to become a sui iuris individual and the latter could
just wish for libertas and civitas, iure privatorum both were definitely excluded
from a full “personality,” prerogative of a pater familias—if one is allowed to
use modern categories. Slaves themselves, despite a few episodes of large-
scale revolts and naïve daily resistance towards their masters,24 appeared to
22 Status civitatis, for instance, enhanced severe obligations that other statuses did not
encompass. If slaves, as res belonging to their masters, were not considered appropriate
for use in war (d. 49.16.11; Plin. Ep. 10.29–30), Romans, as homines liberi et cives, spent long
years risking their own lives on battlefields: see Adrian Keith Goldsworthy, The Roman
Army at War 100b.c.–a.d. 200 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), passim. Up to the first
century b.c., military service constituted a duty embedded at the core of what it meant
to be both a civis Romanus and a fundamental part of the populus Romanus. In the early
second century b.c. over fifty per cent of all Roman citizens performedmilitary service for
an average of about seven years. Under Augustus, one sixth of all Italian citizens served
as soldiers for a standard term of twenty years: See Hopkins, Conquerors and Slaves, 30.
As Polybius attests (Polyb. 6.19.4), moreover, a young member of the Roman aristocracy
could not stand for public office until he had completed even ten years of military service
(Hans Beck, Karriere und Hierarchie: Die römische Aristokratie und die Anfänge des cursus
honorum indermittlerenRepublik [Berlin:Walter deGruyter, 2005], passim). Private slaves
were not Roman citizens; they belonged to Roman citizens and could be, in hypothesi,
maltreated by their domini: this is incontrovertible. Yet, as such, they were kept far from
the ‘noble’ dangers of the ‘bloody’ war. On the contrary, a civis Romanus belonged to his
populus, was at its mercy, and had to perform duties inextricably attached to his status.
Like an everlasting military service.
23 See Eva Cantarella, “Famiglia romana e demografia sociale. Spunti di riflessione critica e
metodologica,” Iura 43 (1992): 99–111. It is important to remark that in her contribution
dedicated to Slavery and Roman Law Jane F. Gardner never focuses on the plain but
fundamental equation between slaves and filii. Slavery, qua tale, naturally creates moral
and ideological repulsion and a society based on slavery cannot be wholly at ease with
itself. Yet, some historical exaggerations, due to this feeling, are well recognizable and
understandable. For instance Keith R. Bradley, Slavery and Rebellion in the RomanWorld,
140b.c.–70 b.c. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989), 38, argues: “slavery as an
institution was based ultimately on the violent subjection of one person to another that
arose from the dominating power claimed when life was spared upon defeat in warfare
… So slaves were always at war with their owners.” Yet, if this were in toto true, the whole
knowledge derived from Roman jurists on the use of slaves, as well as on the the legal and
economic figures of peculia, tabernae and naves would be false. Actually, a master would
not appoint an enemy as a business manager; a master would not grant an enemy part of
his wealth to administer (see infra).
24 Keith R. Bradley, Resisting Slavery at Rome, in Keith R. Bradley and Paul Cartledge, eds.,
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generally recognize and accept such a system. Many of them, once set free,
prospered, integrated themselves into Roman society, and often became slave-
owners themselves.25
The following pages will be devoted to a simple sketch of the above-men-
tioned system entailing the legal status of slaves according to Roman law. One
will illustrate the principles and the rules created by magistrates and jurists
in order to discipline two areas of private law (sale and “agency”) that were
considered highly relevant in the commercial framework. Indeed, these two
areas were strictly connected with one another and sharing a common feature,
that is the fundamental presence of slaves. At times (since they lacked the
status civitatis and libertatis) servi were considered mere res, at times (since
they were homines exactly like liberi and cives) they were considered real
personae, whose legal status often corresponded to that of a filius familias
(since both were not sui iuris personae).
To all people of today, this immediately evokes two contrasting and incom-
patible pictures. On the one hand, the cruel and miserable degeneration per-
meating the illegal human trafficking and the appalling reification of human
beings as objects. On the other hand, the enterprise run by pragmatic, hectic,
and busy businessmen having no hesitation in sacrificing their lives and those
of their dependents on the altar of outright profits.
By interpreting Roman Law by means of non-Roman or current categories,
one cannot avoid seeing a deep contradiction thatmakes slavery itself a liminal
and, thereby, indefinable institution, which would merge the Aristotelian con-
ceptions of bios, i.e. political life, and zoe, i.e. biological life.26 On the contrary,
The Cambridge World History of Slavery 1: The Ancient Mediterranean World (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2011), 361–384.
25 See, for the episode of Furius Chresimus, Plin. nat. hist. 18.41–43.
26 Arist. Pol. 1252 b 27 10. For instance, Orlando Patterson, Slavery and Social Death: A
Comparative Study (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982), 42ff., maintains that the
enigma of slavery supersedes the legal and economic spheres: indeed, slavery marks the
threshold between the inside and outside, collapsing both the political and ontological
differences between the human and the non-human, between being and non-being.
Similarly,GiorgioAgamben,HomoSacer: SovereignPowerandBareLife (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 1998), 109, points out that the concept of ‘bare life’—the paradigm of
which, in his archaeological reconstruction, is the Roman homo sacer (contra, see Luigi
Garofalo, Biopolitica e diritto romano [Napoli: Jovene, 2009], 113 ff.)—, represents “a zone
of indistinction and continuous transition between man and beast.” As such, it would
be the counterpart of the sovereign power on the state of exception and the target of
the sovereign violence. In other words, according to Agamben, “bare life” would not
overlap the concept of “biological existence,” being, on the contrary, the remainder of the
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by interpreting Roman slavery in its legal and social context, one is inclined to
regard it, in spite of its inner liminality, as a coherent and logical figure.27
Slaves and the Roman Law of Sale
Slaves asRes
Since they did not belong to the community of liberi cives, slaves were—in
some respects—like animals, and consequently, the same legal regime applied
to both. For instance, the lex Aquilia, enacted in the 3rd century b.c., seems to
be concerned only with “unjust” damages to slaves, animals, and other types of
property, but notwith damages to free individuals. The first and the third capita
of the statute at issue respectively stipulated: “If anyone shall have unlawfully
killed a male or female slave belonging to another or a four-footed animal,
whatever may be the highest value of that in that year, so muchmoney is he to
be condemned to give to the owner;” and “If anyone shall cause loss to another,
by burning, smashing ormaimingunlawfully,whatevermaybe the value of that
matter in the next thirty days, so much money is he to be condemned to give
to the owner.”28
Suchproximity betweenanimals and slaves, and the consequent legal assim-
ilation is also well attested elsewhere. Nothing makes it clearer that the slaves,
as res (albeit sui generis), could represent the object of ownership, than the
legal discussions of the Roman jurists still in the classical period aboutwhether
an infirmity, an illness, or a bodily or psychological deficiency amounted to a
defect.29The contract of emptio-venditio (i.e. obligatory sale) provides therefore
a good paradigm and testifies the crucial importance of slaves for the Roman
economy.
destroyedpolitical life. Therefore, only ‘enslavement’ (andnot slavery per se) could fit such
a concept, in my opinion.
27 In accordance with such historical perspective, see Jacques Annequin, “Formes de contra-
diction et rationalité d’un système économique. Remarques sur l’ esclavage dans l’Antiquité,”
dha 11 (1985): 199–236; Luigi Capogrossi Colognesi, “La summa divisio de iure personarum.
Quelques considérations à propos des formes de dépendance dans la réalité romaine,”
Actes girea 20 (1994): 163–177.
28 Gai 3.210; Gai 3.218; d. 9.2.2 pr.–1; d. 9.2.27.5; d. 9.2.29.8. For further details, see Sara
Galeotti, Ricerche sulla nozione di damnum 1: Il danno nel diritto romano tra semantica e
interpretazione (Napoli: Jovene, 2015), 97ff.
29 See Gell. 4.2.1–15; d. 21.1.1–4 with RosannaOrtu, Aiunt aediles…Dichiarazioni del venditore
e vizi della cosa venduta nell’editto ‘de mancipiis emundis vendundis’ (Torino: Giappichelli,
2008), 94ff.
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Defective Slaves and Ius Civile
During the last three centuries of the Republic, iure civili the buyer had nor-
mally to take the risk of possible defects that rendered themerx (i.e. the good
sold) unfit for its ordinary or expected purposes. Therefore, if he wanted a spe-
cific warranty that themerx was either free from specific defects or that it had
certain qualities (promissum),30 he had to ask the seller for a stipulatio to that
effect. For instance, the parties could enter a stipulatio to the effect that the
slave was healthy, that it was not a thief, and that it did not rob the corpses of
their grave-clothes.31 Out of this formal and verbal contract, in case of misrep-
resentation, the emptor, in the quality of stipulator, could bring an action ex
stipulatu against the seller-promisor, regardless of the latter’s scientia or igno-
rantia. The contractual liability under this legal action was strict and limited to
the id quod interest (that is the purchaser’s interest in the truth of the promise).
As such, it could go beyond compensation for the lesser value of the object
sold.32 Yet, the buyers ended any consideration of this remedy, its targets, and
its sphereof applicability, as unsatisfactory. In anareaof the lawas important as
the sale of slaves, a special liability needed to be introduced in order to increase
the protection offered not only against frauds perpetrated by sellers, but also
against negligence and unawareness.33
For instance, female slaves were not purchased “solely as breeding stock,”
and they could be sold as healthy even though they were “barren women,”
unless the infertility was due to a bodily defect, but their fecundity was often
a selling point, such as with sheep and cattle. The Severian jurist Paul deals
with the sale of the prospective offspring of a female slave (partus ancillae as a
res sperata), although he is concerned with the availability of the legal action
30 d. 18.1.43 pr.; d. 21.1.19 pr.–3.
31 Ulp. 42 ad Sab. d. 21.2.31. Vincenzo Arangio-Ruiz, La compravendita in diritto romano 2
(Napoli: Jovene, 1956), 356ff.; Giambattista Impallomeni, L’editto degli edili curuli (Padova:
cedam, 1955), 47ff.; Riccardo Cardilli, L’obbligazione di ‘praestare’ e la responsabilità con-
trattuale in diritto romano (ii sec. a.C.–ii sec. d.C.) (Milano: Giuffrè, 1995), 135ff.; Carlo
Augusto Cannata, Sul problema della responsabilità nel diritto privato romano. Materiali
per un corso di diritto romano (Catania: Torre, 1996), 127ff.; Letizia Vacca, “Garanzia e
responsabilità nella vendita. Tradizione romanistica e problemi dommatici attuali,” in
Letizia Vacca, Garanzia e responsabilità. Concetti romani e dogmatiche attuali (Padova:
cedam, 2010), 281–312.
32 Mario Talamanca, “Vendita in generale (diritto romano),” Enciclopedia del diritto 46
(Milano, 1993): 416f.; Dario Mantovani, Le formule del processo privato romano (Padova:
cedam, 1999), 113nt. 630;ChristianBaldus, “Unaactioneexperiri debet? ZurKlagenkonkur-
renz bei Sachmängeln im römischen Kaufrecht,” Orbis Iuris Romani 5 (1999): 20ff., 72 ff.
33 d. 21.1.1.2; d. 21.1.37; d. 21.1.44 pr.–1; Plaut. Capt. 98–101; Cic. de off. 3.17.71; Sen. Ep. 80.9.
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in contract where the merx does not exist and cannot come into existence,
thus implying the impossibility of the seller’s obligation.34 Not disclosing to
the buyer that the slave was barren, or over fifty years old, represented a typical
fraud perpetrated by scientes sellers, but it could amount also to a case of
ignorantia venditoris.
Sales of Slaves in theMarketplace: The Ius Honorarium
Between the third and the secondcenturies b.c., theaediles curules—i.e.minor
magistrates responsible for marketplaces35—through their edict “demancipiis
emendis vendundis” (i.e. “about slaves for sale”)36 introduced a new remedy
for latent defects and diseases called actio redhibitoria.37 In cases in which
34 Beside d. 5.3.27 pr. and d. 21.1.14.1–3, see d. 19.1.21 pr. Even if in the passage at issue the
jurist does not make it clear whether the seller knows about the defect or not, some
scholars maintain that the seller was allowed to start the legal action only if the defen-
dant was aware: Pasquale Voci, “L’estensione dell’obbligo di risarcire il danno nel diritto
romano classico,” in Scritti in onore di Contardo Ferrini publicati in occasione della sua beat-
ificazione 1 (Milano: Società EditriceVita e Pensiero, 1947), 370ff.;Mario Sargenti, “Appunti
sulla quasi possessio e la possessio iuris,” in Scritti in onore di Contardo Ferrini 1, 246; Peter
Stein, Fault in the formationof contract inRomanLawandScots Law (Edinburgh—London:
Oliver and Boyd, 1958), 79; Andrea Rodeghiero, Sul sinallagma genetico nell’‘emptio ven-
ditio’ classica (Padova: cedam, 2004), 35; contra, see Emilio Betti, Istituzioni di diritto
romano, 2.1 (Padova: cedam, 1942), 147 and nt. 26; Ugo Zilletti, La dottrina dell’errore nella
storia del diritto romano (Milano: Giuffrè, 1961), 75 e nt. 158; Frank Peters, “Zur dogma-
tischen Einordnung der anfänglichen, objektiven Unmöglichkeit beim Kauf,” in Dieter
Medicus and Hans H. Seiler, eds., Festschrift für Max Kaser (München: C.H. Beck, 1976),
299.
35 See Éva Jakab, Praedicere und cavere beim Marktkauf. Sachmängel im griechischen und
römischen Recht (München: C.H. Beck, 1997), 116 ff.; Marel Kuriłowicz, “Zur Marktpolizei
der römischen Ädilen,” in Au-delà des frontières: mélanges de droit romain offerts àWitold
Wołodkiewicz 1 (Varsovie: Liber, 2000), 439–456.
36 Impallomeni, L’editto, passim, Antonio Guarino, “L’editto edilizio e il diritto onorario,”
Labeo 1 (1955): 295–266;Max Kaser, “Die Jurisdiktion der kurulischen Ädilen,” inMélanges
Philippe Meylan 1 (Lausanne: Imprimerie Centrale, 1963) 164–191, 173 ff.; David Pugsley,
“The Aedilician Edict,” in AlanWatson, ed., Daube Noster. Essays in Legal History for David
Daube (Edinbrugh: Scottish Academic Press Ltd., 1974), 255ff.; Alan Watson, “Sellers’ Lia-
bility for Defects: Aedilician Edict and Praetorian Law,” Iura 38 (1987) 172; Talamanca,
“Vendita in generale,” 414 ff.; Lorena Manna, Actio redhibitoria e responsabilità per i vizi
della cosa nell’editto de mancipiis vendundis (Milano: Giuffrè, 1994), 95ff.; Aldo Petrucci,
“Osservazioni minime in tema di protezione dei contraenti con i venaliciarii in età com-
merciale (ii secolo a.C.–metà del iii d.C.),” in FedericoM. D’Ippolito, ed., Philia. Scritti per
Gennaro Franciosi 3 (Napoli: Satura Editrice, 2007), 2082ff.; Ortu, Aiunt aediles, 76 ff.
37 Gell. 4.2.1; d. 21.1.1.1. See Otto Lenel, Das ‘EdictumPerpetuum’. EinVersuch zu seinerWieder-
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the seller failed to disclose publicly (palam pronuntiare) any latent disease
or defect (morbus vitiumve), or whether the slave was a runaway ( fugitivus),
a loiterer (erro), or a delinquent under noxal liability (noxae), the action at
issue was indifferent to the defendant’s knowledge or good faith (whereas, in
contrast, ignorantia and scientia venditoriswere relevant iure civili).38 Since this
remedy was not justified by a breach of contract, it looked like an “action in
tort,” depending on the violation of the aedilian provisions.39 Moreover, the
aedilian remedy was directed to the termination of the contract and not to
damages (as, in contrast, the actiones civileswere).40
If, originally, the aedilian provisions were concerned with the sales of slaves
only, later (likely between Cicero and Labeo), the magistrates themselves
extended these provisions to the sales of iumenta, that is beasts of draught.
They also implemented their original system with a new remedy aiming at
the reduction of the purchase-price.41 The aedilian provisions shaped a strong
system of protection. Yet, many sellers of slaves were averse to giving such a
warranty and, by rejecting ex contractu the aedilian provisions, they preferred
to be held liable just for the specific diseases and defects in the terms agreed
upon by the parties to the contract.42
herstellung3 (Leipzig: Tauchnitz, 1927), 560f.; for the application of the edict at issue in
municipia and coloniae, see Francesca Reduzzi Merola, “Per lo studio delle clausole di
garanzia nella compravendita di schiavi: la prassi campana,” Index 30 (2002): 215–226.
38 Cic. de off. 3.17.71; d. 21.1.1.2; d. 21.1.4.4; d. 21.1.17.20; d. 21.1.45, 52.
39 Nunzia Donadio, “Azioni edilizie e interdipendenza delle obbligazioni dell’emptio vendi-
tio. Il problema del giusto equilibrio tra le prestazioni delle parti,” in Luigi Garofalo, ed., La
compravendita e l’interdipendenza delle obbligazioni 2 (Padova: cedam, 2007), 474, 494f.,
518 ff.
40 d. 21.1.23.1 and d. 41.2.13.2, see Ute Wesel, “Zur dinglichen Wirkung der Rücktrittsvorbe-
halte des römischen Kaufs,”Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte 85 (1968):
156; Mario Talamanca, “La risoluzione della compravendita e le conseguenti azioni di
restituzione nel diritto romano,” in Letizia Vacca, ed., Caducazione degli Effetti del Con-
tratto e Pretese di Restituzione. Seminario aristecperB.Kupisch (Roma20–22giugno 2002)
(Torino: Giappichelli, 2006), 24 and nt. 62. For the more recent edictum de iumentis ven-
dundis (d. 21.1.38 pr.) and the actio quanti minoris or aestimatoria, see Donadio, “Azioni,”
518 ff. A full discussion of such remedy will not be found in the present contribution: it
simply aims at presenting and discussing some problems connected with the Roman law
of slavery.
41 d. 21.1.38 pr.; d. 21.1.38.7; Gell. 4.2.8 (Impallomeni, L’editto, 106). Fur further extensions of
the aedilian provisions, see d. 21.1.1 pr.; d. 21.1.38.5; d. 21.1.38.10; d. 21.1.17.19; Arthur De
Senarclens, “L’extention de l’édict des édiles aux ventes de toute espèce de choses,”Revue
historique de droit français et étranger 6 (1927): 385–417.
42 Aulus Gellius, quoting the jurist Sabinus, remarks that it was customary to put felt caps on
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These aedilian ruleswere routinely enforced inday-to-day commercial activ-
ities affecting relationships among Romans as well as between cives and pere-
grini. The system was praiseworthy and helpful, but not exhaustive. What if
a slave (as well as an animal of draught, and a res nec mancipi) was made an
object of a sale, but at the same time the parties entered the contract outside
themarketplace?What if the salewas concluded in themarketplace, but either
the merx was not a slave or the slave had a defect that the aediles did not list
in their edict? What if the seller falsely assured a quality in the slave or other
goods? In these three cases, the aedilian edict was unambiguously unsuitable.
Such legal gaps were required to be filled and thus the Roman jurists provided
new, more effective forms of legal protections.43 In other words, the sale of
slaves represented the legal and ideological prototype as well as the historical
basis for the ancient (and current) remedial systems of buyer—and consumer-
protection.44
As far as the first two aedilian gaps are concerned, it is important to point
out the following points. By the time of the late Republic, the actio empti
itself starts being conceived of as a remedy available not only if the seller had
not performed the contractual oportere dare facere, but also if he somehow
had acted in conflict with “good faith.” Consequently, as we read in Cicero
and Valerius Maximus, the buyer of res mancipi (or, perhaps, of real estate
only) was granted a legal action directly grounded, iure civili, on the sale-
contract, where themerx turned out to have some defects. The classical jurists
often attest the subsidiary use of the contractual action against the dolus
venditoris, as the buyer of the slave was not allowed to start the actio redhibito-
ria.45
the heads of slaves on sale, to pointing out that they were being sold ‘without warranty’
(Gell. 7.4); see d. 2.14.31.
43 Laura Solidoro Maurotti, “Sulle origini storiche della responsabilità precontrattuale,” Teo-
ria e storia del diritto privato 1 (2008): 18 e ntt. 26–27, e soprattutto in Nunzia Donadio, La
tutela del compratore tra actiones aediliciae e actio empti (Milano: Giuffrè, 2004), passim;
Donadio, “Azioni,” 473f., 510ff.
44 Reinhard Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations: Roman Foundations of the Civilian Tra-
dition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 305ff.; Luigi Garofalo, Studi sull’azione redibito-
ria (Padova: cedam, 2000), passim; Luigi Garofalo, “Le azioni edilizie tra ordinamento
romano e codificazioni latinoamericane,” Roma e America 13 (2002): 5–19; Éva Jakab,
“Diebische Sklaven, marode Balken: Von den römischenWurzeln der Gewährleistung für
Sachmängel,” in Martin J. Schermaier, ed., Verbraucherkauf in Europa. Altes Gewährleis-
tungsrecht und die Umsetzung der Richtlinie 1999/44/eg (München: Sallier, 2003), 43 ff.
45 d. 21.1.1.9–10; d. 21.1.2–4; d. 21.1.38.7.
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The action ex empto for damages (that is aiming at the id quod actoris
interest)46 could be started, in accordance with its new extended targets, if the
seller had omitted to disclose any defect known to him.47 In addition, if any
concealment of latent defects could initially amount to a “breach of good faith”
only in case of scientia venditoris,48 the classical jurists, following Julian, started
to suggest further applications of the same remedy: by the second century a.d.,
the buyer could start theactio ex empto evenout of a non-malicious silence.Yet,
where the seller was sciens, the monetary condemnation was restricted to the
reduced value of the objects themselves and to any consequential loss; on the
contrary, the buyer could obtain a mere reduction of the purchase price, such
as in an aedilian iudicium aestimatorium or quanti minoris.49 The contractual
action, being at the beginnings just a subsidiary remedy susceptible to be used
onlywhere the case failed tomeet the conditions required by the aediles, ended
up overlapping the aedilian protections. Thus, adiuvandi iuris civilis causa, it
shaped a two-level systemcharacterizedby theprinciple of “flexibility of action
and choice of procedure.”
As far as the third aedilian gap is concerned, since the last few centuries
of the Republic, the buyer was likely allowed to start the contractual action
where the seller had assured the buyer, by an informal dictum in venditione,
that themerxwas free from certain defects or that it had certain qualities.50 At
first, the buyer could not sue the seller ex empto, if both were in good faith. Yet
the late classical legal science—as Ulpian, albeit hesitantly, attests—changed
such regime. Jurists thought that the informaldictumbrought about reasonable
reliance in the purchaser, whether the venditor was sciens or ignorans of the
misrepresentation. Thus, if the slave being soldwas a thief, and the seller, albeit
unaware, assured the buyer of the contrary in the course of the negotiations,
the seller was held liable under actio empti.51
46 d. 18.1.78.3; d. 18.6.16; d. 19.1.6.4; d. 19.1.13 pr.–2; d. 18.1.45.
47 Cic. de off. 3.16.66; Val. Max. mem. 8.2.1 with Cardilli, L’obbligazione di praestare, 158 ff.;
Laura SolidoroMaruotti,Gli obblighi di informazione a carico del venditore. Origini storiche
e prospettive attuali (Napoli: Satura, 2007), 61 ff., 89ff.
48 See d. 19.1.4 pr.; d. 21.1.19–10; d. 21.1.38.7.
49 d. 19.1.13 pr. See Solidoro Maruotti, Gli obblighi, 71 ff.; Nunzia Donadio, Responsabilità del
venditore per i vizi della ‘res empta’: a proposito di d. 19.1.13.1 (Ulp. 32 ‘ad ed’.), in Index 33
(2005): 481–511. See, moreover, d. 18.1.45; d. 21.1.51 pr. Pace Impallomeni, L’editto, 253 and
Arangio-Ruiz, La compravendita 2, 360 (denying that classical legal science extended the
actio ex empto in case of ignorantia venditoris).
50 d. 19.1.6.4; d. 19.1.13.3; see d. 18.1.45; d. 18.1.78.3; d. 18.6.16; d. 19.1.6.4; d. 19.1.13.2.
51 d. 19.1.13.3; see d. 18.1.78.3; d. 18.6.16; d. 19.1.6.4; d. 19.1.13.2; d. 18.1.45; d. 19.1.6–4; moreover,
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This was the situation between the end of the Republic and the beginning
of the Principate. A need for higher harmonization, as well as for new reforms,
started emerging. Indeed, if a slave sold in themarketplace presented an aedil-
ian defect, the buyer was allowed iure hononario to obtain the judicial termi-
nation of the contract. By contrast, if a slave (as well as anothermerx), did not
present the qualities formally or informally assured, the buyer was allowed iure
civili to sue the seller just for damages (enforcing either a strict liability in case
of stipulatio, or a liability for fraud in case of dictum). As the aedilian remedies
were inspiration for the legal science to attachnewapplications and tasks to the
civilian contractual actions (during thepre-classical and classical period),52 the
casuistic solutions offered by the jurists themselves in the area of the general
law of sales encouraged the enactment of new aedilian provisions in the first
centurya.d. So, if the seller of slaves at themarketplace, througha so-calleddic-
tum promissumve,53 misrepresented the status quo of the merx, he could also
be sued by the aedilian action ad resolvendam emptionem, whether or not he
was aware of his false assumptions.54 As long as the aedilian conditions (con-
cerning the place and the object of the contract) were met, the buyer’s choice
d. 18.1.40.5; d. 18.6.16[15]; d. 18.1.59; d. 18.1.78 pr., 3; d. 19.1.2 e d. 19.1.26; d. 19.1.53; d. 19.1.54.1;
d. 21.2.75.
52 For the extraordinary use of the contractual action ad resolvendam emptionem (that is
“to terminate the sale”), as already supported by Labeo and Sabinus (d. 19.1.11.3), see
d. 19.1.11.5: Solidoro Maruotti, “Sulle origini,” 18 e ntt. 26–27; Solidoro Maruotti, Gli obb-
lighi, 87 f.; Donadio, La tutela, 225ff., 230ff.; Donadio, “Azioni,” 473f., 510ff.; Letizia Vacca,
“Risoluzione e sinallagma contrattuale nella giurisprudenza romana dell’età classica,”
in Letizia Vacca, ed., Il contratto inadempiuto. Realtà e tradizione del diritto contrattuale
europeo (aristec, Ginevra, 24–27 settembre 1997) (Torino: Giappichelli, 1999), 51 ff.; Tala-
manca, “La risoluzione della compravendita,” 7; Solidoro Maruotti, Gli obblighi, 87 f.
53 Franz Haymann, Die Haftung des Verkäufers für die Beschaffenheit der Kaufsache 1 (Berlin:
Vahlen, 1912), 107ff.; Raymond Monier, La garantie contre les vices cachés dans la vente
romaine (Paris: Recueil Sirey, 1930), 50ff., 134ff.; Arangio-Ruiz, La compravendita 2, 360ff.;
Barry Nicholas, “Dicta Promissave,” in David Daube, ed., Studies in the Roman Law of Sale,
dedicated to the memory of F. De Zulueta (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1956), 91–101; Olde
Kalter, ‘Dicta et promissa’. Die Haftung des Verkäufers wegen Zusicherungen für die Beschaf-
fenheit der Kaufsache im klassischen römischen Recht (Utrecht: Utrecht University, 1963),
passim; Heinrich Honsell, Quod interest im bonae-fidei-iudicium. Studium zum römischen
Schadensersatzrecht (München: C.H. Beck, 1975), 68ff., 79ff.; Watson, “Sellers’ Liability,”
172 f.; Manna, Actio redhibitoria, 95 ff.; Baldus, “Una actione experiri debet?,” 72 ff.; Jakab,
“Diebische Sklaven,” 43ff.; Donadio, La tutela, 71 ff., 141 ff.
54 Hor. epist. 2.2.1–19, and, above all, d. 21.1.17.20; d. 21.1.64.1. See, moreover, d. 21.1.18.1;
d. 21.1.4.4. From d. 21.1.38.10 we learn that the Roman jurists extended this remedy and
this target to the sale of draught animals.
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could iure honorario go beyond the protection granted by the contractual civil
action ex empto (primarily concerned with fraudulent sellers).55
Slaves as Contracting Parties and the Roman Law of Business
Agency
Negotiatio and Representation: The Limits of Ius Civile
According to pre-classical and classical Roman law, it is undeniable that slaves
were conceived of as “private property”: they did not belong to the populus
Romanus (as each liber civis did); they belonged to a liber civis. On grounds
of the ius utendi abutendi, a dominus could hypothetically do anything he
liked with his slaves.56 Yet, as already pointed out, they were not only res
or instrumenta susceptible to be used as simple and material work-force for
degrading and heavy activities.57 Rome was, in fact, a society that deeply and
largely relied on ownership on the one side, and on economic employment
of dependents on the other:58 owners and patres familias provided specific
training to highly skilled individuals, both servi and filii, in order to train and
to use authentic “managers.”59
Engaging slaves in business activities was commonplace in Roman soci-
ety at all levels: epigraphic evidence as well as the Justinian Digest describe
slaves buying and selling, acknowledging receipts of money, making loans, and
receiving loans. The highly intricate nature which characterizes Roman slav-
55 See, as supporters of the opinion that actio redhibitoria for dicta promissavewas an aedil-
ian remedy just adiuvandi iuris civilis causa, Arangio-Ruiz, La compravendita 2, 366f.;
Impallomeni, L’editto, cit., 258ff.; Watson, “Sellers’ Liability,” 172; contra, see Nunzia Dona-
dio, “Garanziaper i vizi della cosa e responsabilità contrattuale,” inÉva JakabandWolfgang
Ernst, eds., KaufennachRömischemRecht. Antikes Erbe in den europäischenKaufrechtsord-
nungen (Berlin—Heidelberg: Springer, 2008), 80ff. (maintaining that the dicta promissave
could take place even earlier and thereby the aedilian remedies and the actio empti were
ruled by the principle of subsidiarity too).
56 Gai 1.52. In the Principate the masters’ right to mistreat or arbitrarily slay their slaves was
restricted by law: see Gai 1.53; d. 40.8.2; d. 48.8.11.2; d. 1.6.2; d. 48.8.4.2; C.Th. 9.12.1; i. 1.8.2.
57 A wide range of occupations is well attested even in legal sources: see d. 6.1.28, 9.2.5.3,
19.2.13.4, 24.1.28.1, 30.34.36, 32.65.3, 33.7.12.32, 38.1.7.5.
58 Bradley, Slavery and Society at Rome, 10 ff.; Jean-Jacques Aubert, Business Managers in
Ancient Rome: A Social and Economic Study of Institores, 200b.c.–a.d. 250 (Leiden—New
York—Köln: Brill, 1994), 1 ff.
59 Gunnar Fülle, “The Internal Organization of the Arretine Terra Sigillata Industry: Prob-
lems of Evidence and Interpretation,” The Journal of Roman Studies 87 (1997): 111.
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ery emerges from two paradigmatic sources. The first is a comment of Paul to
Neratius.60 The jurist makes it clear that a slave was plainly considered to be a
“piece of property” (depending on two different opinions, belonging either to
the equipment of the taberna cauponia, i.e. the inn, or to the resources of the
caupona, i.e. the lodgingbusiness).Yet, at the same time, itwas also a “manager”
(that is a dependent appointed to carry out thenegotiatio, i.e. the business).The
second source, aMacedonian funerary inscription,61 well illustrates that a slave
was notmerely (from the legal and economic perspective) a res and an institor,
but also (from the social perspective) a human being for whom one could have
feelings of respect, appreciation, and even love.
Such statusquo requires someadditional explanation. First, obligationswere
binding inter partes only. Out of the “doctrine of privity” and of the absence of
a developed “concept of direct representation,” two principals (cives sui iuris)
exclusively could regularly enter a contractus. In other words, any contract was,
iure civili, source of rights and claims inter partes, and the intervention of a
third party as a representative was regularly excluded.62 Second, this funda-
60 d. 33.7.13 pr.:Maria Antonietta Ligios, Nomennegotiationis. Profili di continuità e di autono-
mia della negotiatio nell’esperienza giuridica romana (Torino: Giappichelli, 2013), 1 ff., 121 f.
61 cil 3.14206.21 = ils 7479. ils 7212 goes even further: in a burial collegium, slave members
reclined at dinner togetherwith freemen.Martial (1.101)mourns the incomingdeathof his
secretary andmanumits him, so that he can die as a free person. The slaveTiro, the literary
assistant of M. Tullius Cicero shared a strong intimacy with his owner and could move
at ease among his aristocratic friends and colleagues: Susan Treggiari, “The Freedmen of
Cicero,” Greece & Rome 16 (1969): 195–204; Susan Treggiari, Roman Freedmen During the
Late Republic (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969), 259ff.
62 According to the “doctrine of privity”, a contract gives no rights and creates no obligations
on any third party or agent except the parties to it; only parties to contracts can bring an
action to enforce their rights or to claim damages. But, by virtue of “direct representation”,
an agent, acting in the name of a principal (so that the third party knows or ought know
this), establishes adirect relationshipbetween theprincipal and the third. As far asRoman
law is concerned, a principal had no contractual action if the transaction was concluded
by an outsider on his behalf. Regularly he could only sue the agent himself on grounds of
“mandate” or “authorized administration.” See RenatoQuadrato, “Rappresentanza (diritto
romano),” Enciclopedia del diritto 38 (Milano, 1987): 418 ff.; A. Kirschenbaum, Sons, Slaves
and Freedmen in Roman Commerce (Washington, d.c.—Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1987),
7 ff.; AlanWatson, Roman Slave Law (Baltimore—London: JohnHopkins University, 1987),
105f. Contra Maria Miceli, Studi sulla rappresentanza nel diritto romano (Milano: Giuffrè,
2008), passim (supporting the existence of direct representation in the area of obliga-
tions); Andreas Wacke, “Alle origini della rappresentanza diretta: le azioni adiettizie,” in
Nozione, formazione e interpretazione del diritto dall’età romana alle esperienze moderne.
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mental legal principle was balanced by another one concerning acquisitions.63
Any property and any right acquired by a slave or a filius immediately and auto-
matically vested in the dominus or the pater. Yet, by law, a dependent was only
entitled to increase his superior’s assets, so that any conveyance implying a pat-
rimonial diminution had to be considered legally ineffective.64 Therefore, the
liberi cives sui iuris who wished to enter legal transactions at a distance could
theoretically obtain rights by appointing a dependent as a commercial agent
and by sending him to a given place. Third, after the first Punicwar, the employ-
ment of people carrying out commercial ventures and managing businesses
functions “on behalf of” others became de facto inevitable65 and constituted—
asUlpianmakes clear—a key-area of the praetorian law, as it had intensive and
important consequences from the economic point of view.66 On the one hand,
since it is highly unlikely for a pater familias to have had a sufficient number of
filii—natural or adopted—to post as agents, slaves played the most important
role in running any business of great scale. On the other hand, the flows affect-
ing the above-depicted systemmade it very difficult to employ a dependent to
carry out a proper and proficient commercial activity.
Without appropriate legal mechanisms for enforcing contracts between
trading partners, as well as without means for monitoring agents in remote
locations, Roman economy would have quickly collapsed, and the Mediter-
ranean world would not have integrated the Roman markets. If one of the
contracting parties was a servus or a filius familias, in the quality of “agent,”
indeed the doctrine of privity of contract as well as the principle of represen-
tation, needed not be applied in its strictest sense. Moreover, under a contract
Ricerche dedicate al Professor Filippo Gallo 2 (Napoli: Jovene, 1997), 607 (suggesting the
existence of direct representation in Roman law).
63 Ownership and rights could be acquired through slaves, but not alieno nomine through
extraneous free representatives (See Gai 2.87; Gai 2.95; d. 45.1.38.17; d. 50.17.73.4; i. 2.9.5,
3.19.19).
64 Gai 2.95; d. 50.17.133; d. 46.4.8.4.
65 Andrea Di Porto, Impresa collettiva e schiavo “manager” in Roma antica. (ii a.C.–ii d.C.)
(Milano: Giuffrè, 1984); Andrea Di Porto, “Filius, servus, e libertus. Strumenti dell’impren-
ditore romano,” in Matteo Marrone, ed., Imprenditorialità e diritto nell’esperienza storica
(Erice 22–25 novembre 1988) (Palermo: Arti grafiche siciliane, 1992), 231–260; Andrea Di
Porto, “Il diritto commerciale romano. Una “zona d’ombra” nella storiografia romanistica
e nelle riflessioni storico-comparative dei commercialisti,” in Nozione formazione e inter-
pretazionedel diritto dall’età romanaalle esperienzemoderne. Ricerchededicate al Professor
Filippo Gallo 3 (Napoli: Jovene, 1997), 413–452; Feliciano Serrao, Impresa e responsabilità a
Roma nell’età commerciale (Pisa: Pacini Editore, 1989), passim.
66 d. 14.3.1.
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concluded between a servus (promisor) and a third-party (promisee), a mere
debitum-creditum relationship took place (that is a relationship not protected
byactio); no legal vinculum arose.67Accordingly, the creditor hadnoprocedural
remedy, neither against the slave, nor against the dominus. The former had no
proprietary capacity (from the substantive perspective), as well as no standing
to appear in court as a defendant (from the procedural perspective). The latter,
out of the doctrine of privity and the conception of dependents as ‘instruments
of acquisition’, was not liable. Obviously, as long as this was the case, nobody
would have dealt with a servus or a filius familias: such an inequality was exces-
sively detrimental and risky even to thosewho needed (and not just wanted) to
enter a contract with a dependent. Some correction was therefore necessary.
The Praetorian System: the Slave’s Duty to Perform and theMaster’s
Liability
The situation changed through the praetorian introduction of legal remedies
during the mid or late Republican period.68 The Roman praetor created three
actions both allowing the so-called natural creditors to sue the principal of a
business under the contractual obligation (or, better, the contractual oportere)
undertaken by his agent (obviously, if and only if the contract was concluded
on account of the business he had been put in charge of).69
A first remedy, named actio exercitoria (action for shipping), allowed claims
against ship-owners (exercitor) for contracts concludedwith the captain of the
ship (magister). A second one, that is the actio institoria, was susceptible to be
67 Gai 3.119a; d. 35.1.40.3; d. 46.1.16.4.; d. 44.7.10. Carlo Pelloso, “Il concetto di actio alla luce
della struttura primitiva del vincolo obbligatorio,” in LuigiGarofalo, ed., Actio in remeactio
in personam. In ricordo diMarioTalamanca 1 (Padova: cedam, 2011), 235 and nt. 187, 293ff.
68 Gai 4.69–74a. Emilio Valiño, “Las actiones adiecticiae qualitatis y sus relaciones basicas en
derecho romano,” Anuario de Historia del Derecho español 37 (1967): 339–480; Luuk De
Ligt, “Legal History and Economic History: the Case of the Actiones Adiecticiae qualitatis,”
Tijdschrift voor Rechtsgeschiedenis 47 (1999): 205–226; Aubert, Business Managers, 46ff.;
Joseph Plescia, “The Development of Agency in Roman Law,” Labeo 30 (1984): 171; Maria
Miceli, Sulla struttura formulare delle actiones adiecticiae qualitatis (Torino: Giappichelli,
2001), 188ff.; AndreasWacke, “Die adjektizischen Klagen im Überblick i. Von der Reeder-
und der Betriebsleiterklage zur direkten Stellvertretung,” Zeitschrift der Savigny Stiftung
für Rechtsgeschichte 111 (1994): 280–362; Coppola Bisazza, Dallo iussum domini, passim; Di
Porto, Impresa collettiva, 35 ff., 196ff. The problem concerning the chronological order of
the praetorianmeasures at issue is under debate: seeValino, “Las actiones adiecticiae qual-
itatis,” 344ff.; Aubert, Business Managers, 78 ff. and De Ligt, “Legal History and Economic
History,” 212 ff.
69 d. 14.3.5.11; d. 14.1.7; d. 14.3.13 pr.; d. 14.5.1.
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started against the principalwhohad appointed a “commercial agent” (institor)
in charge of a business, for dealings carried out by the latter. Finally, at least as
early as Labeo’s age,70 where the principal had made an invitation (iussum)—
addressed either to potential third parties or to the dependent71—the principal
was liable in solidum, that is for the total amount of the debt. Litigation, as
the praetorian formulae attest, involved two fundamental questions. Is there
a debitum-creditum relationship between the claimant and the dependent?72
Was thedependent dealingwith thirdparties out of a defendant’spraepositioor
iussum? If the answer was yes, the principal was exposed to unlimited liability:
had the agents accumulated heavy losses within the terms of the appointment
(praepositio), the principal would have remained without any protection.73
Obviously, a principal could satisfy a claim better than his agent could; thus
a customer, de facto, would have started these actiones as first resorts, even if
the agent had not been a dependent.
Thepraetorian remedy constituted theonly vehicle of protection for the cus-
tomer, provided that the agent had been a dependent. As it is well known, a
slave, being merely an instrument of a dominus, had no proprietary capacity
and no standing to appear before magistrates and judges. In classical Roman
law, in contrast, a filius could personally be bound by the contract; he could
appear before magistrates and judges; he could even be condemned. Yet, since
he continued to be considered as a free citizen without a very “proprietary
capacity,” no execution of the possible condemnatory judgment could fol-
low.
Ulpian reports that the praetor introduced a further remedy, alongside the
creation of the three actiones directed to enforce the principal’s unlimited
liability and Gaius points out the subsidiary and residual nature of the new
actio.74 Itwas based on the peculium,—that is a fund granted by a pater familias
70 See d. 15.4.1.9 compared with d. 15.3.16.
71 Patricio Lazo, “Contribución al estudio de la actio quod iussu,”RevistadeEstudiosHistórico-
Jurídicos 32 (2010): 83–105; Coppola Bisazza, Dallo iussum domini, 155 ff. (against Alfred
Pernice, Marcus Antistius Labeo. Das Römische Privatrecht 1 [Halle: Buchhandlung des
Waisenhauses, 1873], 505); Javier Hernanz Pilar, El iussum en las relaciones potestativas
(Valladolid: Universidad de Valladolid, 1993), 87ff., 130.
72 Pace Miceli, Sulla struttura formulare, 17 ff., 185 ff., 230: see Pelloso, “Il concetto di actio,”
296ff.
73 Obviously, if a dominusmakes it clear that a servus is just an employee and not a business
manager bymeans of a proscriptio, the liability is not unlimited: see d. 14.3.11.2–4; d. 15.1.47
pr.; d. 15.1.29.1.
74 d. 15.1.1 pr.; d. 14.5.1.
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or a dominus to a person in his power, either filius, or servus—, and it did
not matter whether or not the former knew of, or consented to, the latter’s
negotiatio.
Indeed, this patrimonial entity named peculium—as the jurists maintain—
was concretely what a slave kept separate from his master’s account, with the
latter’s initial permission, and after deducing all that the former owes the latter
as well as, according to some jurists, all dependants attached to the familia.75 It
was composedbyanykindof property andcommodities, suchasmovables, real
estate, credits, debits, and—aswehave already seen—evenother slaves (vicarii
or peculiares) could be parts of the “dedicated peculiar assets.”76 All these items
were de iure property of the principal. Yet, as one can infer from Marcellus,
the dependent in charge of them, by means of a general permission,77 could
deal with them as if they were his own: as a human being, a peculium could
be born, grow, decline, and die.78 As a result, a slave operating with a peculium
ended up becoming de facto a very independent “businessmanager” who acted
rather independently from his dominus, taking on much of the responsibility
of the commercial activity.79 In short, in order to retain the profits generated, a
75 d 15.1.5.4; d. 15.1.4 pr.; d. 15.1.9.2–3; in the definitions of peculium put forward by Roman
jurists, a key-point emerges: the accounts are kept separately from those for the rest
of the owner’s patrimony. See Gabriel Micolier, Pécule et capacité patrimoniale. Etude
sur le pécule, dit profectice, depuis l’ édit ‘de peculio’ jusqu’à la fin de l’ époque classique
(Lyon: Bosc Frères, 1932), passim; Ignazio Buti, Studi sulla capacità patrimoniale dei servi
(Napoli: Jovene, 1976), passim; David Johnston, “Peculiar Questions,” in Paul McKechnie,
ed., Thinking Like a Lawyer: Essays on Legal History and General History for John Crook
on his Eightieth Birthday (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 5; Roberto Pesaresi, Ricerche sul peculium
imprenditoriale (Bari: Cacucci, 2008); Jean-Jacques Aubert, “Productive Investments in
Agriculture: Instrumentum Fundi and Peculium in the Later Roman Republic,” in Jesper
Carlsen and Elio Cascio, eds., Agricoltura e scambi nell’Italia tardo-repubblicana (Bari:
Edipuglia, 2010), 167–185; Ulrike Roth, “Food, Status, and the Peculium of Agricultural
Slaves,” Journal of Roman Archaeology 18 (2005): 278–292; Feliciano Serrao, Diritto privato,
economia e società nella storia di Roma 1 (Napoli: Jovene, 1984), 298; Serrao, Impresa e
responsabilità, 27 ff.; Di Porto, Impresa collettiva, 42 ss.; Di Porto, “Il diritto commerciale
romano,” 424ff.
76 d. 15.1.7.4–7; d. 15.1.17.
77 d. 15.1.7.1.
78 d. 15.1.39. A peculium existed out of amaster’s or a father’s permission. It could bemodified
by means of transactions due to special or general authorisations. Yet, the owner—as
Pomponius maintains—had not to know in detail its precise contents and its changes
(d. 15.1.4.1–6).
79 Alfons Bürge, “Lo schiavo (in)dipendente e il suo patrimonio,” in Corbino, Humbert and
Negri, ed., Homo, caput, persona, 377ff., 382ff.; Emanuele Stolfi, “La soggettività commer-
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slave negotiator cum peculiowas personally interested in running the business
accurately: even if this clearly does not mean that, in practice, economic life
was regularly structured through the peculium (as opposed to a praepositio or
to a iussum) and that economic assets were purposefully and primarily placed
in the peculiumwith a view to running the business.80
Even if it is true that a peculium turned out to be a private fund rather than a
way to structure liability, it is equally true that out of it creditors were given
recourse against the dominus or the pater familias for damages.81 Yet, such
a remedy was restricted to the amount of the peculium, and not to the full
extent of the creditum obtained by the dependent, as one can infer from the
edictal name of the remedy, that is “actio de peculio,” later incremented through
the clause “aut de in rem verso” (according to which the versio represented a
contributing factor in calculating the liability ceiling, rather than a negative
condition).82 On the one hand, this actio was indeed based on the contractual
debitumnaturale83 entered by a dependent (for instance in the quality of buyer,
lessee, borrower etc.), as well as on the preceding grant of a fund of property
ciale dello schiavo nel mondo antico: soluzioni greche e romane,” Teoria e storia del diritto
privato 2 (2009): 1–32.
80 Johnston, “Peculiar Questions,” 5: the peculium represented an important device of bal-
ancing the interests of those involved in trade, both by imposing some liability, and by
restricting the liability, otherwise in solidum. Obviously, what law provides (that is a lim-
ited liability of the owner for slaves running businesses) does not necessarily correspond
with what happens in practice.
81 d. 15.1.1.4; d. 15.1.2. See Barbara Abatino, Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci and Enrico C. Perotti,
“Early Elements of Corporate Form: Depersonalization of Business in Ancient Rome,”
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 31.2 (2011): 365–389; Barbara Abatino and Giuseppe Dari-
Mattiacci, “Agency Problems and Organizational Costs in Slave-Run Businesses,” Amster-
dam Law School Research Paper 4 (2011): https://ssrn.com/abstract=1942802.
82 Gai 4.72, 4.74a; i. 4.7.4. The praetor introduced the optional condition that the commercial
dealing had determined a patrimonial increment benefitting the owner. Thus, the value
of the peculium was relevant only if the claimant did not prove that the defendant, pater
or dominus, had obtained a benefit from the transaction. Therefore, regardless of the
value of the peculium, iure praetorio, the natural creditor had recourse to the extent of
the benefit that had flowed in rem. Tiziana J. Chiusi, Die actio de in rem verso im römischen
Recht (München: C.H. Beck, 2001); Buti, Studi, 155 ff.; De Ligt, “Legal History and Economic
History,” 215–216; see, moreover, for a different view, Geoffrey MacCormack, “The early
history of the actio de in rem verso (Alfenus to Labeo),” Studi in onore di Arnaldo Biscardi 2
(Milano: Cisalpino–La goliardica, 1982), 319–339; GeoffreyMacCormack, “The later history
of the actio de in rem verso (Proculus to Ulpian),” Studia et Documenta Historiae Iuris 48
(1982): 318–367.
83 See Pelloso, “Il concetto di actio,” 235ff., 253ff. (with bibliography and sources).
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(as the intentio, which does not refer at all to the peculium, makes clear). On
the other hand, it was directed to enforce the reus’ limited liability (as the
condemnatio, which is expressed in terms, and to the extent, of the peculium,
attests).84 The sui iuris individual, liable under this action, was at risk up to
the value of the assets composing the fund that his slave or his filius had been
entrusted, even if the former had no idea what the latter was concretely doing.
In this vein, therefore, the regular rules concerning bankruptcy proceedings did
not apply, as well as the liability—albeit limited—to which the principal was
exposed was a strict one, as his ignorantia and scientiawere irrelevant.
Since all these remedies allowed a creditor to bring an action against the
principal, they enhanced a breach of the rule that the person of debitor (i.e.
the party that had to perform under contract) corresponded to the person
of the obligatus (i.e. the party that was sued in case of non-performance). In
other words, through these actions praetorian Roman law makes it clear that
Schuld and Haftung turned out to be two separate and divisible aspects of the
obligatory phaenomenon.
The Peculium, the Independent Slave-Manager and theMultilevel
Liability
A pater or a dominus could be sued on account of his dependant’s dealings for
as much as—but no more than—the value of the peculium, only de residuo.
The “principal” incurred “peculiar liability” only if the following two negative
84 David Johnston, “Suing the Pater Familias: Theory and Practice,” in John W. Cairns and
Paul J. du Plessis, eds., BeyondDogmatics. Law and Society in the RomanWorld (Edinburgh:
Edinburgh University Press, 2007), 173–184. Any peculium’s value may fluctuate, either
increasing, or diminishing, or vanishing its substance. In case of litigationon the peculium,
according to Ulpian, if the peculiar fund has no assets at the beginning of the proceedings
(that is at the time of the litis contestatio), but it has some value when the judgment
is given, the actio de peculio turns out to be grounded (d. 15.1.30 pr.). Moreover, if the
peculium is insufficient by the time of the judge’s sententia, but, then, an increment occurs
so that the whole debt can be repaid, the creditor, just partially compensated, is allowed
to get the first judgment voided and thereby to start anew the actio de peculio for the
residuum (d. 15.1.30.4). If the servus dies, is manumitted, or is alienated, the peculium
ceases de iure to exist. Notwithstanding that, the Roman praetor allows the creditor to
start the actio de peculio for awhole year after the events at issue: indeedmaterial losses or
gainsmay still occur and these are fictitiously conceived of as increments and decrements
of the peculium itself (d. 15.2.1 pr.–1; 15.2.3). Even a malicious removal of the peculium by
the owner could take place (d. 15.1.21 pr.): the praetor imputed to the peculium property
that ceased to be in it due to the fraud, so that its value had to be taken into account in
calculating the cap of the owner’s liability (Buckland, The Roman Law of Slavery, 218 ff.).
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conditionsweremet.Hehadnot appointedhis dependent to carry out business
activities (i.e. no praepositio took place). He had not permitted a particular
transaction or more dealings (i.e. no iussum was given). Obviously, liability
continued to be limited by the value of the peculium if the claimant could
not prove (or was not interested to prove) that the defendant had obtained
a direct benefit due to the enrichment that had followed the transaction (i.e.
no evidence of a versio in rem was given). The value of the peculium (or,
alternatively, the amount of the benefit) represented the legal “ceiling” or “cap”
of liability for a Roman citizen that did not want to (or could not) be directly
or indirectly involved in the exercitio negotiationis.
Accordingly, Gaius explains that nobody could be so thoughtless as to start
a subsidiary remedy, such as the actio de peculio vel de in rem verso, if the
creditor—starting, in contrast, anactio exercitoria, or institoria, orquod iussu—
could recover in full (being the reus held liable to expectation and restitution
damages in solidum). Under the “peculiar legal action,” on the one hand, the
claimant was to demonstrate that either the slave with whom he had entered
the contract had obtained a peculium, or that a patrimonial benefit accrued to
the dominus. On the other hand, liability was restricted to patrimonial assets
that were ultimately very hard to determine and to prove before the judge.85
Sometimes a Roman enterprise could be much more complex and hier-
archically structured. For instance, a person (a), being in the power of a sui
iuris citizen (b), could ordinarily act as a magister navis (the captain of the
ship) even if he did not own the ship and the equipment. Yet, a—granted with
the ship, alongside other goods, such as servi peculiares or vicarii—could even
act as a very exercitor (i.e., usually, the shipowner himself), and accordingly
appoint one of his “peculiar slaves” (c). This servus peculiaris, after the appoint-
ment, could undertake natural obligations ex contractu with third parties. A
dissatisfied creditor (d), without protection iure civili, had to bring a praeto-
rian actio against b (the owner of the ship) and not against A (the exercitor) or
c (themagister): this is incontrovertible. Nevertheless, was b’s liability limited
or unlimited? Ulpian provides a satisfactory answer. On the one hand, if a ran
the maritime business according to b’s voluntas, then the latter’s liability for
contracts concluded by c and d was without limitation. On the other hand, if
the business was carried on just by the voluntas, and at the initiative, of a, bwas
exposed to liability just up to, and not more than, a’s peculium.86
85 Gai 4.74. In this vein, some texts point out the importance of rationes (accounts), making
it clear, that peculia’s accounts were kept separately from those for the rest of the owner’s
patrimony.
86 d. 14.1.1.19: see David Johnston, “Law and Commercial Life of Rome,” Proceedings of the
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In other words, as far as a one-layer business is concerned, the person
who appoints a dependent as magister navis or institor is held liable with-
out limitation (as it is when a iussum is concerned). Indeed, the former is
the owner of the company assets, and is aware of the negotiatio carried on by
the latter, that is his servus ordinarius. On the contrary, should a dominus or
a pater familias not make any praepositio, but give his dependent a taberna
or a navis as mere elements included in the peculium, the situation would
totally change. Actually, the situation is even more complicated. If the “prin-
cipal” knows about the commercial operation, and does not forbid it (so that
the conditions of scientia and patientia are met), the creditor can choose to
start an actio tributoria instead of the actio de peculio vel de in rem verso.87
Under this remedy, the reus is exposed to a limited liability (being the merx
peculiaris, i.e. the amount used for the particular business under litigation, the
maximum threshold), and the creditors are not topped by the principal, with
regard to the distribution of the peculium in case of bankruptcy.88 If the lat-
ter is ignorant, there is only the actio de peculio, so that he is liable within the
amount of the assets attached to the dependent (or, possibly, within the bene-
fit).
In case of a business articulated on two layers, the liability of the Roman citi-
zenbeing in the top-level position is limited to the amount of the first peculium,
if the following conditions occur. The navis or the taberna just amount to
bona peculiaria; the dependent appoints a servus vicarius of his; the pater
familias or the dominus is not aware of the business. On the contrary, if a
Cambridge Philological Society 43 (1997): 53–65; Di Porto, Impresa collettiva, 228ff.; András
Földi, “La responsabilità dell’aventepotestàper atti compiuti dall’exercitor suo sottoposto,”
Studia et Documenta Historiae Iuris 64 (1998): 183.
87 Tiziana J. Chiusi, Contributo allo studio dell’editto ‘de tributoria actione’ (Roma: Accademia
nazionale dei Lincei, 1993), 372ff.; Tiziana J. Chiusi, “Zum Zusammenspiel von Haftung
und Organisation im römischen Handelsverkehr: scientia, voluntas und peculium in
d. 14,1,1,19–20,”Zeitschrift der Savigny Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte 124 (2007): 94–112. Con-
tra, see Emilio Valiño, “La actio tributoria,” Studia et Documenta Historiae Iuris 33 (1967):
103–128.
88 Under the actio tributoria, liability was limited by the amount of the peculium used in
relation to the particular business (d. 15.1.8). Gaius suggests that the choice between
the actio de peculio and the actio tributoria is fundamental: if it is true that the merx
peculiarismight consist just in a small part of the whole peculium, it is likewise true that
possible deductions in favour of the owner should not always be significant (d. 14.4.11; see
d. 14.4.1.2). The claimant’s choice does in any case extinguish his claim (d. 14.4.9.1); see
d. 14.4.1 pr.; d. 14.4.1.3; d. 14.4.5.11.
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commercial operation is carried out by a servus vicarius undertaking natural
obligations, the praetorian liability cannot go beyond the value of the sub-
peculium’s assets where the servus ordinarius had not appointed the negotiator
and totally ignores the business.
Servi:That is, Slaves?
To conclude, at first Roman law introduced magisterial remedies that, by
enforcing obligations iure praetorio, overcame ius civile and allowed those who
needed or intended to do business with dependents-agents to sue their owners
or their fathers: servi, exactly in the same way as filii familias, are conceived of
as business managers whose activity the principals disdain and consider wor-
thy passing on.The risk of an economic collapse—connected to the patriarchal
structure of the Roman familia and the nature of civil obligatio—is removed by
protecting third contracting parties and making the principals liable without
limitation on grounds of their voluntas. Indeed, the first three actiones adiecti-
ciae seem to be better suited for a local or regional trade, concerning a situation
characterized by proximity among commercial partners.89 For a dependent to
be of some utility in commercial activities embedded in a wider space, it was
necessary for the principal to incur in some liability, yet not too much. Thus,
the praetorian system further eased the employment of dependents in carry-
ing out commercial dealings, both by discouraging the direct involvement of
the principal, andmaking both slaves and filii familias loyal independent busi-
ness agents (through a limitation of the former’s liability).90 Thus, the problem
of monitoring was ultimately solved,91 and at the same time the prototype of
89 Pace Jean-Jacques Aubert, “Dumtaxat de Peculio: What’s in a Peculium, or Establishing the
Extent of the Principal’s Liability,” in Paul J. du Plessis, ed., New Frontiers Law and Society
in the Roman World (Edinburgh: University Press, 2013), 204 (who does not consider
d. 40.9.10). See András Földi, “Remarks on the Legal Structure of Enterprises in Roman
Law,”Revue Internationale des Droits de l’Antiquité 43 (1996): 179–211 and 201 ff.
90 For the important role played by virtues such as probitas and fides in enforcement, see
HenrikMouritsen,The Freedman in theRomanWorld (Cambridge—NewYork: Cambridge
University Press, 2011).
91 For a simplistic view suggesting that, by granting a peculium and so, by encouraging slaves
to self-enforce the performance of the assigned tasks, masters wanted to lower their costs
of supervision, see Hopkins, Conquerors and Slaves, 125 ff.; Willem J. Zwalve, “Callistus’s
Case: Some Legal Aspects of Roman Business Activities,” in Lukas De Blois and John Rich,
eds., The Transformation of Economic Life under the Roman Empire (Amsterdam: Gieben,
2002), 127; see Andreas Fleckner, “The peculium: A Legal Device for Donations to Personae
Alieno Iuri Subiectae?,” in Filippo Carlà and Maja Gori, eds., Gift Giving and the Embedded
Economy in the AncientWorld (Heidelberg: UniversitätsverlagWinter, 2014), 222.
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the Roman noble farmer, as depicted by Columella, was safe: sui iuris individu-
als could keep away from business, under the protection offered by law.
People that one nowadays would define as lacking legal, patrimonial and
procedural capacity carved up the economic sphere and business. Wealth and
progress were in the hands of people labelled with a term evoking nowadays
“outcasts and rejects”: slaves.
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